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The Family Peer Effect on Mothers’ Labor Supply†
By Cheti Nicoletti, Kjell G. Salvanes, and Emma Tominey*
The historical rise in female labor force participation has flat-
tened in recent decades, but the proportion of mothers working full 
time has increased. We provide the first empirical evidence that the 
increase in mothers’ working hours is amplified through the influence 
of family peers. For identification, we exploit partially overlapping 
peer groups. Using Norwegian administrative data, we find positive 
and statistically significant family peer effects, but only on the inten-
sive margin of women’s labor supply. These are in part driven by 
concerns about time allocation from early childhood and concerns 
about earnings from age five. (JEL J12, J16, J24, J31)
Over the last century and in almost all developed countries, female labor par-ticipation has been characterized by a steep increase, which has been driven 
mainly by mothers’ labor participation (Eckstein and Lifshitz 2011, and Fogli and 
Veldkamp 2011). Such changes in the mothers’ labor supply may have been trig-
gered by the increase in the availability of child care, cultural changes, the intro-
duction of fertility control methods, and other institutional and policy changes. 
However, the influence of peers on individual labor decisions can amplify the effect 
of such triggering events and may ultimately be the reason for the rapid increase 
in female labor participation over time (see Maurin and Moschion 2009, Fogli and 
Veldkamp 2011; Mota, Patacchini, and Rosenthal 2016).
More recent decades have seen a flattening of the trend in mothers’ labor partic-
ipation rates, but a steady increase in the proportion of mothers working full-time. 
This is true in Norway (see Figure 1) and other OECD countries (Blau and Kahn 
2013),1 indicating that current changes in female labor supply are along the inten-
sive margin. In this paper, we provide the first empirical evidence on the causal 
influence of peers on the working hours of mothers in each of the first seven years 
post childbirth. In comparison, previous papers that have estimated the causal peer 
1 Blau and Kahn (2013) shows the large (small) increase in female participation in OECD countries (US) is 
accompanied by no change (a fall) in part-time and therefore an increase in full-time work. 
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effect on mothers’ labor supply have focused exclusively on the extensive margin 
(see Maurin and Moschion 2009; Mota, Patacchini, and Rosenthal 2016).2
A mother’s work decisions after childbirth may have long-term effects on her 
human capital, earnings and employment prospects (Edin and Gustavsson 2008), 
and on her child’s outcomes (Ermisch and Francesconi 2005; Bernal 2008; Liu, 
Mroz, and van der Klaauw  2010;  Bernal and Keane 2011;  Del Boca, Flinn, and 
Wiswall 2014). There are two main channels through which mothers’ labor deci-
sions can be affected by their peers’ decisions. One is transmission of information, 
which may be caused by the uncertainty of the effect of maternal employment on 
children, which leads mothers to look to peers for information (Fogli and Veldkamp 
2011). The other is imitation, where a mother’s utility may increase by behaving 
similarly to her peers (see Akerlof and Kranton 2000).
We use Norwegian administrative data covering the full population and identify 
individuals’ family relations over multiple generations as well as identifying where 
people are living each year. This means that we focus on naturally occurring peer 
groups from the complete network of family peers and neighbors. We identify the 
causal influence of the family network on long-run labor supply decisions of moth-
ers post childbirth, in addition to the effect of neighbors as in existing studies. The 
mother is more likely to interact meaningfully with her family members than with 
peers outside the family such as neighbors, leading to a stronger peer effect on wom-
en’s labor decisions from her family. The causal effect of the family network has 
been studied in some recent papers that have focused on the spillover effect of sib-
lings on various outcomes but not on female labor supply.3 Contrary to these papers, 
we focus on a wider definition of family network that goes beyond the household 
members and includes cousins as well as siblings.
The identification and estimation of the effect of peers has proved to be challeng-
ing because of the issues of reflection (simultaneity), correlated omitted variables, 
and endogenous peer membership (Manski 1993, Moffitt 2001). The empirical strat-
egy to solve the potential reflection and endogeneity issues is based on instrumen-
tal variable estimation, exploiting partially overlapping peer groups (Bramoullé, 
Djebbari, and Fortin 2009; Lee, Liv, and Lin 2010; De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and 
Redaelli 2010). More precisely we instrument the hours of work for family peers—
sisters and female cousins—with hours worked for recent mothers in their neigh-
borhood, relying on the fact that the neighbors of a mother’s family peers do not 
affect her labor decisions directly but only indirectly through the family peers’ labor 
decisions. Moreover, we measure the effect only for those neighbors who gave birth 
before the mothers’ relatives to solve any reverse causality issues between family 
and their neighbors. We can therefore instrument the average decisions of the fam-
ily peers with average characteristics of the family’s neighbors. We mainly use the 
working hours of the family’s neighbors as the instrumental variable. An illustration 
2 A possible exception is Olivetti, Patacchini, and Zenou (2016), which looks at the intensive margin on 
 women’s labor supply and estimates the causal peer effect of a woman’s school mates’ mothers while controlling 
also for the mothers’ working hours.
3 See Oettinger (2000); Monstad, Propper, and Salvanes (2011); Adermon (2013); Qureshi (2015); Joensen and 
Nielsen (2018); Aparicio-Fenoll and Oppedisano (2016); Dahl, LØken, and Mogstad (2014); Nicoletti and Rabe 
(2016); Altonji, Cattan, and Ware (2017). 
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of the strategy would be a situation where my sister was weighing up the advantages 
and disadvantages of working particular hours and looked to her neighbors. This 
interaction affected the labor  supply of my sister, and I either took information from 
my sister about working hours or I imitated her behavior.
The endogenous peer membership may occur if the likelihood to interact with 
peers depends on unobserved characteristics that also affect the outcome variable. 
Relating to our paper, the likelihood to form interactions may depend on the selec-
tion into the neighborhood only, as individuals cannot select their family. To control 
for the potential unobserved common genetic traits and covariates between the labor 
supply of the mothers’ neighbors and of her family peers neighbors we include as 
control variable the average worked hours of the mothers’ neighbors. This is similar 
to a neighborhood fixed effect, excluding the mother.4 In addition, we control for an 
extensive set of mother, father, and child characteristics, as well as for the average 
of these characteristics across family peers, which can affect the labor decision of 
women after childbirth.
A residual endogeneity bias could remain if there are contextual or environmental 
influences that affect areas which are larger than a neighborhood, potentially includ-
ing both the mothers’ and her family peers’ neighborhoods. Examples of these sce-
narios include (i) general equilibrium effects where my family’s neighbor took a job 
that I would have applied for; (ii) the mother working with her family’s neighbor; 
(iii) the mother having grown up with her family’s neighbors. Our results are robust 
to specifications that control for these potential biases. Lastly, we conduct a set of 
falsification or placebo tests, by, for instance, matching mothers with fictitious rela-
tives with similar characteristics as the actual relatives (see Section VI).
Our sample consists of mothers giving birth in Norway between 1997 and 2002 
(see Section III for a description of the data) and uses an estimation approach that 
takes account of potential biases caused by the omission of neighborhood charac-
teristics, the reflection problem, and endogeneity and measurement error issues (see 
Section II). We find that cousins and sisters have a statistically significant causal 
(endogenous) peer effect on the number of hours worked by mothers of preschool 
aged children (see Section IV). We also provide some suggestive empirical evidence 
of what explains the family peer effect (see Section V). We find that the family peer 
effects seem driven by mothers’ concerns about time investment in the child, while 
they seem driven also by concerns about earnings only when the child is five and 
six years old.
Finally we provide some evidence of the magnitude of the family peer effect 
with a back of the envelope computation of the social multiplier effect. Any change 
in public policies or events, which lead to an increase in labor supply, will affect 
mothers’ worked hours both directly and indirectly through the influence of peers. 
Based on our results the social multiplier factor is equal to 1.5, which means that, if 
the direct effect is an increase in the labor supply by  ∆ hours, the total effect will be 
given by  ∆ multiplied by 1.5.
4 Controlling for the IV (hours worked) defined at the mothers’ neighborhood level (what we call the individual 
IV) controls additionally for the exclusion bias, described in Caeyers and Fafchamps (2016) and Section II. 
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I. Previous Literature
Looking at previous papers on peer effects on women’s labor supply, there are 
only three papers that have attempted to estimate a causal (endogenous) peer effect 
on women’s labor participation. Maurin and Moschion (2009) and Mota, Patacchini, 
and Rosenthal (2016) focus on neighborhood rather than family peer effects, find-
ing evidence of  a statistically significant effect of neighbors’ labor decisions on 
womens’ own decisions. Olivetti, Pattacchini, and Zenou (2016) focus on the peer 
effect of mothers and of school mates’ mothers and find that there are statistically 
significant effects on a woman’s hours worked from both her mother’s hours and of 
the average hours across school mates’ mothers.
Several studies on peer effects have explored outcomes other than labor supply, 
which have looked at peer groups defined as work colleagues (Mas and Moretti 2009; 
and Dahl, LØken, and Mogstad 2014), neighbors (Durlauf 2004) and school mates 
(Sacerdote 2011, and Lavy, Silva, and Weinhardt 2012). It is only more recently that 
empirical studies have begun to estimate the effect of peers by exploiting the intran-
sitivity of the network to identify a person’s peers of peers, who can affect her only 
indirectly through her peers. This approach has borrowed from the spatial statistics 
(see Kelejian and Prucha 1998 and Lee 2003) and it is now being used in several 
empirical economic studies (see Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin 2009; Chen 2014; 
Mora and Gil 2013; and Patacchini and Venanzoni 2014). Generally these studies 
are based on surveys that collect details of a sample of individuals and their peers, 
such as the US National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (AddHealth), 
which provides details on school mates and their peers. Because there are not many 
of these surveys, some new empirical studies have begun to rely on administrative 
data with details on the population of individuals and peers defined as neighbors, 
work colleagues, or school mates (see De Giorgi, Pelizzari, and Redaelli 2010; De 
Giorgi, Fredriksen, and Pistaferri 2016; and Nicoletti and Rabe 2016).
II. Identification and Estimation of Within-Family Peer Effects
We consider the following mean regression model:
(1)  y i = α +  y 
_
−i ρ +  x i β +  x 
_
−i γ +  ε i ,  
where the subscript  i denotes mothers in our sample and  i = 1,  … , n ;  y i is the 
number of weekly hours worked by mother  i in a specific year after childbirth;  x i 
is a row vector with  K individual maternal exogenous variables;  y 
_
−i =  
 ∑ j∈ P Fi   y j  _______ n Fi  is 
the family average of  y excluding individual  i ;  x 
_
−i =  
 ∑ j∈ P Fi   x j  _______ n Fi  are the 
corresponding averages of the vector of variables  x ;  P Fi is the set of family peers of 
mother  i excluding herself, i.e., the subsample of mothers who belong to the same 
family (sisters or cousins);  n Fi is the number of family peers of mother  i ; and  ε i is 
an error term with  E(  ε i | x )  = 0 . The scalar parameter  ρ measures the endoge-
nous family peer effects,  γ = [  γ 1 ,  … ,  γ K ] ′ is a  K × 1 vector of exogenous family 
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effects,  β = [  β 1 ,  … ,  β K ] ′ is a  K × 1 vector of the effects of the corresponding  K 
mothers’ characteristics  x i , and finally the scalar parameter  α is the intercept.
To solve the potential reflection and endogeneity issues we use an instrumental 
variables approach that can be viewed as an extension of the approach introduced by 
Kelejian and Prucha (1998), and Lee (2003).5 The extension consists of considering 
interactions occurring between people within multiple rather than a single network.6 
We consider the family and neighborhood networks, and assume that each mother 
interacts with her family members (cousins and sisters) and with her neighbors, but 
that mothers do not interact with her family’s neighbors. In practice you may imag-
ine a scenario where my sister was weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of 
working particular hours and looked to her neighbors. This interaction affected the 
labor supply of my sister and I either took information from my sister about working 
hours or I imitated her behavior.
Note that we consider homogenous neighbors i.e., neighbors who have given 
birth shortly before the sister or cousin and with the same education, defined as 
having a degree or not. The approach to consider homogenous peers has become 
standard in recent papers on neighborhood peer effects and it is justified by the fact 
that interactions between non-homogenous peers are not likely.7
We can use the averages of the variables  x and the dependent variable  y for 
the neighbors of the mothers’ family members as instrumental variables for  y 
_
−i . 
Let  x 
_
N,−i =  
 ∑ j∈ P Ni   x j  _______ n Ni  and  y 
_
N,−i =  
 ∑ j∈ P Ni   y j  _______ n Ni  be the neighborhood average of  x and  y 
excluding the mother  i , where  P Ni are the sets of neighbor peers of mother  i exclud-
ing herself and  n Ni is the number of neighbor peers of mother  i ; then our instrumen-
tal variables can be defined as  x −NF,−i =  
 ∑ j∈ P Fi   x 
_
N,−j  _________ n Fi  and  y 
− NF,−i =  
 ∑ j∈ P Fi   y 
_
N,−, j _________  n Fi  . For our 
main results we use the instrumental variable  y − NF,−i , but in our sensitivity analysis 
we consider also a set of additional instruments,  x −NF,−i , which are based on birth 
outcomes (low birthweight, very low birthweight, congenital malformation, severe 
deformity, and multiple births).
We make sure that the instrumental variable  y − NF,−i is predetermined by consider-
ing the working hours of peers that have given birth in the past.8
As in any other type of application, to be valid our instrumental variables must 
be (i) relevant, i.e., they must be important in explaining the average working hours 
after childbirth of family peers, our instrumented variable; and (ii) exogenous, i.e., 
they must be uncorrelated with unobserved variables explaining the mothers’ work 
status after childbirth. We discuss condition (i) in Section IV where we measure the 
statistical significance of our instrumental variable and condition (ii) refers to the 
issue of correlated unobservables which we discuss now.
5 See also Lee (2007), Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009); Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou (2009); 
Lee, Liu, and Lin (2010); and Lin (2010). 
6 Nicoletti and Rabe (2016) and De Giorgi, Fredricksen, and Pistaferri (2016) also identify peers considering 
multiple networks. 
7 See Mota, Patacchini, and Rosenthal (2016). 
8 Similarly De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redaelli (2010) and Nicoletti and Rabe (2016) use the average for the 
peers of peers of variables which are good predictors of the dependent variable and observed in the past (e.g., 
lagged test scores to predict current test scores and self-reported expectation on future decisions to predict current 
decisions). 
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We can assure that our instruments are exogenous if there are no omitted neigh-
borhood characteristics and if neighborhood peers of the mothers’ family peers do 
not interact directly with the mother in question. We consider three potential devia-
tions from these assumptions and our strategies solve for them.
First, our instrumental variables are defined at the neighborhood level. If mothers 
and their family peers tend to sort into similar neighborhoods, then failing to control 
thoroughly for the mothers’ neighborhood traits can lead to an overestimation bias 
of the family peer effect. For example, I and my family peers may choose to live in 
areas with good childcare coverage, making it easier for us to return to work. Any 
correlation between our decisions after having children may reflect common local 
childcare provision and not a peer effect. We are concerned that the hours worked 
by neighbors of family peers,  y − NF,−i , can be correlated with the hours worked by 
the mothers’ neighbors,  y 
_
N,−i , and similarly that the neighborhood average of the 
covariates for the family peers,  x −NF,−i , can be correlated with the average covariates 
across the mothers’ neighbors,  x 
_
N,−i . We avoid this potential bias by controlling for 
the average worked hours of the mothers’ neighbors excluding herself, which we 
call “individual IVs” and average covariates across the mothers’ neighbors. This 
means that we include  y 
_
N,−i ( x 
_
N,−i ) among the explanatory variables in equation (1) 
whenever we use as instrumental variable  y − NF,−i ( x 
−
NF,−i ), and estimate the following 
model:
(2)  y i = α +  y 
_
−i ρ +  x i β +  x 
_
−i γ +  y 
_
N,−i δ +  ε i .  
Controlling for the individual IVs corrects not only for the bias caused by unob-
served characteristics of neighbors but also for the exclusion bias (see Guryan, 
Kroft, and Notowidigdo 2009; Caeyers and Fafchamps 2016). We estimate equation 
(2) using a two-stage least squares estimation. Because we control for the individual 
IV,  y 
_
N,−i in both first and second stages, the estimated effect of the instrument  y 
− NF,−i 
is net of the effect of neighbors of family members living in the same neighborhood 
as the mother in question.
Second, we worry about potential interactions between a mother and the neigh-
bors of her family peers. If such interactions exist then the family peers’ neighbors 
could have a direct effect on the mother, and therefore the average characteristics of 
the neighbors of her family peers,  x −NF,−i and  y 
− NF,−i , would be invalid instruments. 
As mentioned above, equation (2) controls for any interactions between mothers 
living in the same neighborhood as her family. However, even for mothers living in 
different neighborhoods as their family, our instruments could be invalid if there are 
unobserved factors explaining labor market decisions of both the peers of peers and 
the mother in question. Examples of these scenarios include general equilibrium 
effects where my family’s neighbor took a job that I would have applied for, if I 
work with or grew up with my family’s neighbor, or if there are direct interactions 
between a mother and her family peers’ neighbors. We consider potential threats to 
the validity of our instruments and perform sensitivity analyses to show that our esti-
mation results are not affected by such threats. Finally, we use multiple instruments 
and test the overidentifying restrictions to assess the validity of our instruments (see 
Section VI).
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Third, labor supply decisions of family peers may affect the corresponding deci-
sions of their neighbors because of the so-called feedback or reverse causality effect. 
This implies that our instruments, which are average characteristics of the family 
peers’ neighbors, may be correlated with the error term in our main equation. We 
avoid this potential bias by considering only neighbors that had their first child 
between one and five years earlier than the family living in the same neighborhood.
To support that there is no residual endogeneity bias, we also consider the estima-
tion of the family peer effect using sister and cousin—in laws who have no genetic 
link to the mother— and we consider some placebo tests in Section VI. In particular, 
we consider the estimation of the family peer effect when replacing the family mem-
bers with randomly chosen family peers with similar characteristics of the mother 
(placebo test 1), with the same date of birth of the mother (placebo test 2), and with 
cousins who give birth in the future (placebo test 3).
A remaining threat to our strategy, which we cannot test, is where a mother’s 
behavior is affected by her family’s neighbors, but the family’s behavior is not. An 
illustration of this threat would be a situation where I just had a baby and my cousin 
tells me that her neighbor was very happy to go back to work soon after giving birth 
and I got influenced by this bit of information and decided to go back to work early, 
even if my cousin was not influenced by her neighbor experience and did not go 
back to work early. In this situation there is a potential direct effect from my cousin’s 
neighbor to me. However, we think the likelihood of a mother changing her behavior 
in response to information which her sister or cousins did not react to is small.
Finally, the estimation of the family peer effect on hours worked is prone to atten-
uation bias caused by measurement error in the variable used to construct labor 
hours. Our instrumental variable estimation corrects for such bias under the assump-
tion that the labor hours of the family peers and of their neighbors have uncorrelated 
measurement errors, which is credible.9
III. Data
A. Data and Sample Selection
We use Norwegian administrative register data for the period 1960–2010, which 
are collected and maintained by Statistics Norway. The data provides unique linkage 
of the population of Norway across different registers and across time, providing 
information to enable identification of family members and neighbors living in the 
same zip code and information on labor market status, the month and year of birth, 
birth outcomes, earnings, and demographic variables including age and education.
For all births since 1960, we extract identifiers of the newborn’s mother from 
census data. We then link on the sisters and cousins of this child’s mother by the 
following method. To link the mothers with her sisters we define her mother’s iden-
tifier (the maternal grandmother of the child). Mothers to children with a com-
mon maternal grandmother are siblings. In order to link the mother to her female 
9 See Appendix A for full details. 
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 cousins, we take her maternal and paternal grandmothers’ identifiers and consider 
all mothers with either a shared maternal or paternal grandmother (the two maternal 
great-grandmothers of the child). Any mothers to children with a common maternal 
great-grandmother are defined as cousins. This creates a set of maternal cousins 
(whose child’s maternal grandmother has the same mother) and a set of paternal 
cousins (whose child’s maternal grandfather has the same mother). We can identify 
the cousins as long as their grandmothers are alive in the first census year in 1960. 
Assuming an average gap of 30 years between generations and considering chil-
dren born in 1997, their two maternal great-grandmothers would be born in 1907 
and be 53 years old in 1960. This suggests that children born from 1997 onward 
are likely to have their two maternal great-grandmothers alive in 1960. Our main 
sample is selected from all births between 1997 and 2002. We cut off births before 
1997 because we want to minimize the number of cases of children with mater-
nal great-grandmothers who are not identifiable because they are not alive in 1960. 
Births after 2002 are not considered, as we need to observe the labor supply of 
mothers up to seven years after the childbirth year, and information on labor supply 
are currently available up to 2010. So that future decisions of family cannot affect 
contemporaneous decisions of the mother, the family peer group of a mother when 
she gives birth is constructed as all cousins who have given birth in the past, which 
is defined as at least one month prior to the mother.
We construct a measure of weekly hours worked by the mother from the labor 
market register, which started in 1986. Hours is recorded as a discrete variable tak-
ing the values of 0, 1–19, 20–29, and 30+. We create a variable for hours by taking 
the mid-point of these categories, thereby recording hours as 0, 10, 24.5, and 40 as 
the final category which represents a full-time contract in Norway.
The neighborhood peer group is constructed by linking each mother to all other 
mothers living in her zip code, and we select only those neighbors giving birth 
between one and five years earlier than the mother. Restricting the neighbors and 
family peers to women who gave birth in the past, we avoid the fertility contagion or 
peer effects from neighbors and family members (see Kuziemko 2006). Furthermore, 
to consider a more homogeneous definition of neighborhood, we consider mothers 
who live in the same zip code and with the same level of education, defined by an 
indicator for having a degree. Our assumption here is that neighbors are much more 
likely to interact with other neighbors with the same level of education.
Next we take from the administrative register variables, which control for the tim-
ing of the mothers’ birth. We also consider the level of education of the mothers10 
and a quadratic in the age at birth which together proxy for years of experience in 
the labor market. Additionally we construct an indicator for working before child-
birth, which takes the value one if mothers worked in the year prior to childbirth and 
zero otherwise.11
10 We treat this variable as predetermined, as only 8 percent of mothers increase their education during 
the sample period. 
11 To assure that our results are not confounded by later fertility decisions, we interact the family peer effect 
with a dummy for not having another child within the sample window and with the exception of one year, find no 
significant interaction. 
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We drop from our sample families where the mothers’ siblings have different 
fathers. We select first births to each mother because the decision to work after 
having a child differs across the birth order of offspring. We therefore compare 
like-with-like when comparing the decision of the mother with that of her peers. 
The sample of births occurring between 1997 and 2002 consists of 45,985 first births 
to mothers with at least one sister or female cousin.
Table 1 shows that the family peer group consists of on average 3.074 maternal 
cousins, 3.149 paternal cousins, and 0.614 sisters. The second peer group—homog-
enous neighbors—is larger, with on average 26.924 neighbors living in the same zip 
code. To give a little information on the size of a zip code, there are on average 3,100 
individuals and 1,400 households within this neighborhood, but the relevant group 
of neighbors (which is defined as the group of mothers living in the same zip code, 
giving birth to their first child between one and five years earlier than the mother in 
question, and with the same level of education) is evidently smaller. It is not very 
common for a mother to live in the same zip code as her family peers (1 percent of 
mothers) but much more likely to live in the same municipality (23 percent).
Looking at the labor participation of mothers in the year after childbirth, we find 
that on average mothers work 18.6 hours a week with a variation within family that 
is only 12 percent of the total variance. This compares to variation within neighbors 





Number of maternal cousins 3.074 2.698 0 32
Number of paternal cousins 3.149 2.727 0 32
Number of sisters 0.614 0.748 0 7
Number of neighbors 26.924 33.256 1 296
Individual characteristics
Mother worked after 1 year 0.602 0.489 0 1
Hours worked after
1 year 18.640 17.855 0 40
2 years 19.313 17.759 0 40
3 years 19.340 17.660 0 40
4 years 20.523 17.515 0 40
5 years 21.841 17.357 0 40
6 years 22.544 17.274 0 40
7 years 23.463 17.095 0 40
Mother worked 1 year before birth 0.776 0.417 0 1
Mother’s education 13.251 2.280 9 21
Father’s earnings, K1,000 243.333 173.089 0 17,520.5
Father’s work status 0.977 0.150 0 1
Mother’s age at birth 25.818 4.364 16 45
Father’s age at birth 29.322 5.266 17 62
Low birth weight indicator 0.048 0.213 0 1
Very low birth weight indicator 0.006 0.078 0 1
Congenital disorder at birth 0.041 0.198 0 1
Severe deformity at birth 0.025 0.155 0 1
Twin indicator 0.018 0.133 0 1
Child’s year of birth 1999.594 1.703 1997 2002
Child’s month of birth 6.450 3.414 1 12
Observations 45,985
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new mothers increases steadily from 18.6 in the year after childbirth to 23.5 hours 7 
years after childbirth. On average 77.6 percent of mothers work in the year prior to 
childbirth, mothers have on average 13.3 years of schooling. Nearly all fathers (97.7 
percent) work in the birth year of their first child, and the age of mothers and fathers 
at the first births is on average 25.8 and 29.3 years, respectively. We control for the 
month of birth and a set of controls relating to birth outcomes of the child, includ-
ing an indicator for twins, low birthweight, congenital malformation, and severe 
deformity, which may drive the labor supply of a mother. These birth indicators are 
relatively rare events, with 4.8 percent and 0.6 percent of newborns having a low or 
very low birthweight child, respectively; 4.1 percent and 2.5 percent of newborns 
having congenital disorders and severe deformity, respectively; and 1.8 percent of 
births being non-singletons, but they are potential determinants of maternal labor 
supply, so important controls for labor market participation of new mothers.
All our estimations control for the list of variables reported in Table 1 as well as 
for a set of dummies for the year and month of birth. We include these dummies to 
control for the potential bias caused by the measurement error on the working hours 
(see Appendix A for details) as well as to take account of potential institutional and 
policy changes.
IV. Estimation Results
In Table 2, we report the results for the linear in mean model (see equations (1) 
and (2)). We report the estimated family (sisters and cousins) peer effect on moth-
ers’ weekly hours worked in each of the seven years after the first childbirth, with 
each column representing the estimated family peer effect in a different post child-
birth year. By row, we report three different estimates of the family peer effect: 
the OLS (ordinary least squares), the 2SLS (two-stage least squares), and the 
2SLS with control for the IV at individual level (2SLS Individual IV).12 We use 
the same instrumental variable across the seven columns, which is the average 
across the neighbors of mothers’ family peers of the working hours one year after 
childbirth. More precisely, we take for each cousin (sister), the mean of this vari-
able defined across the set of her homogenous neighbors (i.e., neighbors living 
in the same postal code area, giving birth between one and five years prior to the 
family member and with the same level of education), and then we average these 
means across the mothers’ sisters and cousins who gave birth before the mother. 
The corresponding IV at individual level is defined by taking the average of the 
worked hours one year after childbirth across the mothers’ neighbors who gave 
birth between one and five years earlier than the mother. In all regressions, we 
control for the correlated effects by including individual characteristics that are 
likely to be similar between family members and relevant in explaining moth-
ers’ labor supply. In particular we consider the mothers’ years of education in 
level and squared, an indicator for working in the year prior to childbirth, fathers’ 
earnings and work status in the year of childbirth, fathers’ and mothers’ age at 
12 The OLS and 2SLS estimations are applied to model (1), whereas the 2SLS Individual IV is applied to 
model (2). 
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the birth of the child and their squares, child health conditions at birth (dummies 
for low birthweight, for very low birthweight, for congenital malformations and 
severe deformity), and an indicator for multiple births. We control for potential 
cohort and seasonality effects by including nine birth cohort year dummies and 
dummies for the month of birth. We control additionally for the contextual peer 
effect by including family peer means of the same set of covariates. We allow for 
correlation in the error terms within municipalities in all regressions and correct 
the standard errors to take account of this.
The OLS estimates of the family peer effect are very similar across post birth 
years and suggest that a one hour increase in the mean family peers’ hours supplied 
to the labor market is associated with an increase in mothers’ labor supply by about 
half an hour. However this is not a causal peer effect for two reasons. First, there is a 
potential upward bias caused by the reflection problem and other potential endoge-
neity issues caused by omission of variables, which could explain both the mothers’ 
and her family peers hours worked. Second, the coefficient is prone to attenuation 
bias from measurement error (see Section Appendix A for details) and a negative 
bias caused by the exclusion of the mother from her family group peers (see Caeyers 
and Fafchamps 2016).
To correct for the biases caused by endogeneity issues and measurement error 
inherent in OLS estimation, we report 2SLS estimation results. The 2SLS estimate 
of the family peer effect increases for all post-birth years and seems to suggest that 
the OLS estimation is affected by an attenuation bias caused by measurement error, 
which is larger than the overestimation bias caused by the reflection problem and 
other potential endogeneity issues. The 2SLS estimation is still potentially biased 
because of the exclusion issue and of the potential sorting of family peers into sim-
ilar neighborhoods. Caeyers and Fafchamps (2016) show that the exclusion bias 
Table 2—Estimation Results of the Family Peer Effects: First Birth
Mothers’ working hours
Years post-childbirth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
OLS 0.540 0.542 0.540 0.534 0.527 0.537 0.529
(0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
2SLS 0.639 0.786 0.825 0.846 0.697 0.741 0.557
(0.143) (0.131) (0.129) (0.145) (0.131) (0.162) (0.155)
F-statistic First Stage 47.23 58.43 62.41 31.02 40.31 35.89 39.27
Hausman test p-value 0.49 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.20 0.21 0.86
2SLS individual IV 0.152 0.446 0.400 0.383 0.304 0.344 0.235
(0.196) (0.160) (0.180) (0.196) (0.167) (0.197) (0.201)
F-statistic First Stage 37.07 48.48 52.05 37.52 38.79 27.69 32.57
Hausman test p-value 0.10 0.56 0.48 0.46 0.22 0.35 0.18
Observations 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by municipality. OLS (Ordinary Least Squares); 2SLS (two-
stage least squares); 2SLS (Individual IV two-stage least squares) controls for the IV at individual level. Regressors 
include mothers’ and fathers’ years of education and their squared values, dummies for working during pregnancy, 
fathers’ earnings and work status in the year post childbirth, fathers’ and mothers’ age and age squared at birth, 
dummies for low birth weight, for very low birth weight, for congenital malformations and severe deformity, an 
indicator for multiple births, birth cohort year and month of birth dummies, and family peer means of the same set 
of covariates. F-statistic is the F-test for  H 0 : instruments have zero coefficients.
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is negative and converges to zero when the sample size tends to infinity if the peer 
group size remains small. Because, in our sample, the largest family group has size 
32 while the sample size is 45,985, we expect a very small and negligible exclusion 
bias. On the contrary, we expect the omission of neighborhood characteristics that 
are similar between the mother and her family peers to lead to an over-estimation 
bias, which can be  substantial if mothers’ neighbors and family peers’ neighbors 
have very similar worked hours. Controlling for the average worked hours of the 
mothers’ neighbors, i.e., the individual IV, allows us to eliminate both the biases 
(see the 2SLS individual IV in Table 2). Because the estimated family peer effects 
reduce considerably, we infer that the over-esitmation bias caused by the sorting of 
family peers into similar neighborhoods is much larger than the potential negative 
exclusion bias.
We find no statistically significant peer effect in the year after birth, but strong 
and significant peer effects for the following years ranging between 0.30–0.45. 
The effect is strongest at two years after childbirth, whereafter statistical significance 
along with magnitude declines across the years. This implies that an increase in 
mean working hours of the mothers’ family peers by one hour leads the mother 
to raise her hours by 18–27 minutes. The exception is the family peer effect at 
seven years after childbirth, which is not statistically significantly different to zero. 
Nevertheless, because the family peer effects are not very precisely estimated, we 
cannot conclude that there is a systematic difference of the peer effect on mothers’ 
labor supply seven years after childbirth.
We compute Hausman tests to check the assumption of equality between the 
coefficients estimated using the 2SLS individual IV estimation and OLS estima-
tion controlling for the individual IV, and we do not reject the equality assumption 
at standard levels of significance (see p-values in Table 2). If we assume that the 
exclusion bias be insignificant because of our large sample size, then differences 
between the two estimations are caused by the fact that the OLS estimation is 
biased by measurement error and endogeneity issues (in particular by the reflection 
and omitted variables issues). Therefore the Hausman test results suggest that the 
attenuation bias caused by measurement error is of equal magnitude but opposite 
sign compared with endogeneity biases. The F-tests for the significance of the 
instrument reported at the bottom of Table 2 suggest that our instrumental variable 
is strong and statistically significant.
We apply the 2SLS Individual IV estimation for all our further regression analysis 
because the measurement error and endogeneity biases do not necessarily always 
cancel each other. We consider the 2SLS Individual IV estimation results reported 
in Table 2 as our preferred results and the benchmark against which we com-
pare any further estimation. The full regression results for the 2SLS Individual IV 
estimation are reported in Appendix Table A1 (split in two parts, part A and part 
B) for the second-stage estimation and in Appendix Table A2 for the first-stage 
estimation.
To summarize, an hour increase in the mean labor market participation of mothers’ 
family peers is associated with an increase in hours worked by the mother of between 
18–27 minutes once we control for measurement error, unobserved neighborhood 
characteristics, the reflection issue and a potential exclusion bias.
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V. What Explains the Family Peer Effect?
In this section, we assess the importance of different channels that drive the fam-
ily peer effect on mothers’ labor decisions. In Section VA, we examine whether the 
family peer effect on mothers’ worked hours is driven mainly by a peer effect on 
mothers’ earnings power. In Section VB, we compare the family peer effect at the 
intensive and extensive margins. For this, we assess whether the effect of the family 
peers on the mothers labor market decisions come mostly through her participa-
tion decisions rather than through her decision about how many hours to work. In 
Section VC, we estimate the neighborhood peer effect in order to compare our esti-
mates to the literature on the influence of peers on mothers’ labor supply decisions. 
In Section VD, we give some magnitude to the family peer effect by calculating the 
social multiplier effect.
A. Time and Money Investments
When a mother with young children makes a decision about whether to work or 
stay at home, she faces a trade-off. On the one hand, increasing hours worked may 
be a concern for a mother because of the potential constraints imposed on the time a 
mother can spend with her child. On the other hand, reducing hours worked can also 
be a concern because of the related reduction in earnings and increased constraints 
imposed on family consumption and monetary investments in the child.13 The liter-
ature has found that time investments of parents are highest in the early child neigh-
borhood and falling across age (Del Boca, Monfardini, and Nicoletti 2012; Guryan, 
Hurst, and Kearney 2008; Zick and Bryant 1996) while financial investments tend 
to increase as children age (Kornrich and Furstenberg 2013 show that expenditure in 
child education is flat between years 0–2 but increasing thereafter). For this reason 
mothers may be influenced by their family peers through time spent with their child 
and through increased earnings, and this influence may vary across child age.
We explore these two channels by analyzing how the mothers’ hours worked 
respond to the mean earnings of her family peers. In Table 3, we report the effect of 
the average earnings across family peers on mothers’ hours worked, estimated using 
a 2SLS with individual IV. We find that this earnings effect is not statistically dif-
ferent from zero in the first three years after childbirth, while it becomes significant 
in the fourth, fifth, and sixth year after childbirth. To give some idea of magnitude, 
family earnings, deflated to 2000, have been standardized to have a mean of zero and 
a standard deviation of one. The results show that a standard deviation increase in 
the family’s earnings four years after birth (which equates to approximately 18,000 
Norwegian Krone or US$2,000) leads the mother to increase her hours worked by 
3.6 hours. Five years and six years after birth a standard deviation change in the 
family peer’s earnings raises the mothers’ hours by 2.9 and 2.3 hours, respectively.
The lack of statistically significant peer effect in earnings in the early years sug-
gest that women with very young children are not concerned with the financial 
13 Models of parents making investment decisions which drive child human capital include Bernal (2008), 
Cunha and Heckman (2007), Cunha et al. (2010), and Carneiro et al. (2015). 
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investments of their family peers but with time investments of mothers in their chil-
dren. On the contrary, once the child is in its fourth year, the earning consequences 
become relevant for mothers and they begin to be influenced by the earnings of their 
peers. This finding is in line with the literature that suggests the time investments are 
more important for very young children and financial investments begin to matter 
more later in life.
B. Intensive and Extensive Margins
We show in Figure 1 that in recent years, a substantial shift in female labor sup-
ply has come through a change in hours worked. We aim now to provide evidence 
that the family peer group influences the mothers’ decisions through the intensive 
margin, rather than through a participation decision. In Table 4, we analyze how 
important peers are in the decision to return to work versus stay at home. We report 
the results of the 2SLS Individual IV estimation of the linear probability model for 
mothers’ labor participation using the same explanatory variables and instruments 
as in our main estimation. While in Table 2 we find that an increase in the mothers’ 
family peers average hours worked leads to an increase in the mothers’ worked 
hours, in Table 4 we find no statistically significant effect on the mothers’ labor 
participation. Therefore we conclude that the relevant effect of family peers is at the 
intensive, rather than the extensive margin of mothers’ labor supply.14
C. Neighborhood Peer Effect
There are no studies that have estimated the causal effects of family peers on 
mothers’ labor supply but, as noted in the introduction, there are two papers that 
have focused on causal neighborhood effects on women’s labor participation, which 
are Maurin and Moschion (2009) and Mota, Patacchini, and Rosenthal (2016).15
14 We also regressed the family peers’ participation on the mothers’ labor participation. With the exception of 
two years after childbirth, there was no significant family peer effect of participation. Note that between 3–7 years 
after birth the F-statistic falls to below 10, which again suggests that peers do not influence the participation deci-
sion of mothers in this period. 
15 There are some studies that look at the association in labor participation decisions across family peers, but 
their results do not have a causal interpretation (see Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) for the effect of sister-in-law’s 
Table 3—Effect of the Average Earnings of Family Peers on Mothers’ Hours Worked
Mothers’ working hours
Years post-childbirth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2SLS individual IV 0.950 2.252 2.089 3.567 2.864 2.339 1.500
(1.885) (1.863) (1.441) (1.443) (1.144) (1.083) (1.141)
F-statistic First Stage 229.50 168.10 195.30 178.80 190.50 156.70 177.10
Hausman test p-value 0.11 0.21 0.09 0.43 0.16 0.05 0.01
Observations 45,984 45,984 45,984 45,984 45,984 45,984 45,984
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by municipality. Earnings are measured standardized to have 
mean zero and variance one. 2SLS Individual IV is the two-stage least squares that controls for the individual IV. 
The regressors are the same as in Table 3. F-statistic is the F-test for  H 0 : instruments have zero coefficients.
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To compare to these papers, we now adapt our identification strategy to estimate 
the neighborhood peer effect on the mothers’ working hours. We still estimate equa-
tion (2), but we exchange the roles of the neighbors and family peers and consider 
an instrumental variable estimation. The instrument therefore is the average hours 
worked of the (homogenous) neighbors’ family peers.16 Again we control for the 
individual IV, which in this case is the mean hours worked by the mothers’ family, 
excluding the mother (2SLS Individual IV).
Results are presented in Table 5, where we report the 2SLS Individual IV. For one 
hour increase in the average worked hours of the mothers’ neighbors, the mother 
increases her hours by between 2 and 17 minutes. Nevertheless, the peer effect is 
employment on a woman’s own employment probability; Del Boca, Locatelli, and Pasqua (2000), for the effects 
of work status of the mother-in-law and of the mother on a woman’s own employment; and Fernández, Fogli, and 
Olivetti (2004) for the effect of having a mother-in-law who works on the probability of own (female) work). 
16 Neighborhood peers are defined as those giving birth between 1–5 years before the mother, with the same 






Panel A. Secondary education or less Panel B. Higher education
1994 1998 2002 2006
Part time Full time
2010 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
Figure 1. Mothers’ Labor Supply
Note: Authors’ own computation using Norwegian register data.
Table 4—Family Peer Effect on Mothers’ Labor Participation
Mothers’ participation
Years post-childbirth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Family peers’ hours −0.003 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.002 −0.002 −0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
F-statistic First Stage 37.07 48.48 52.05 37.52 38.79 27.69 32.57
Hausman test p-value 0.03 0.12 0.26 0.22 0.09 0.02 0.03
Observations 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by municipality. 2SLS Individual IV is the two-stage least 
squares, which controls for the individual IV. The regressors are the same as in Table 3. F-statistic is the F-test for 
H 0 : instruments have zero coefficients. 
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statistically significant at the 5 percent level, only between 3–5 years after child-
birth. The instrument is highly significant (see F-tests first stage reported in Table 5), 
which suggests that the absence of a significant neighborhood effect for some of the 
years is not caused by a weak instrument. This seems to suggest the family peers 
have a stronger effect than neighborhood peers.
Maurin and Moschion (2009) find that a 10 percentage point increase in the per-
centage of close neighbors participating in the labor market raises individual partic-
ipation by 6 percentage points. The magnitude of this neighbor effect seems larger 
than our neighborhood peer effect and more similar in magnitude to our family peer 
effects estimated using 2SLS Individual IV. In their most robust estimation Mota, 
Patacchini, and Rosenthal (2016) find that one additional working homogeneous 
neighbor increases the probability of a woman working by about 4.5 percentage 
points, one additional non-working homogenous neighbors decreases her probabil-
ity by about 9 percentage points, whereas the labor participation of non-homoge-
nous neighbors do not have any significant effect. These effects seem smaller than in 
Maurin and Moschion (2009) and perhaps more in line with our estimates.
D. How Important Is the Family Peer Effect?
Whether the labor supply decisions of a mother affect those of her family mem-
bers is interesting from a policy perspective because the direct effect of any policy 
aiming at raising labor hours of mothers, such as the US Family and Medical Leave 
Act, is likely to be amplified through the indirect effect of peers influence. We now 
provide a calculation of the multiplier effect using the results in Table 2. If the fam-
ily peer effect is a source of social interaction, we expect to find a multiplier greater 
than one. Imagine a policy that leads to a one weekly hour increase for the targeted 
mother. Through the family peer effect, the policy would increase also hours worked 
by her sisters and cousins. We calculate the multiplier effect as  1 ____ 
1 −  ρ ̂
, where  ρ ̂ is an 
estimate of  ρ defined in equation (2) and take the mean multiplier across the seven 
estimates . The mean multiplier effect is 1.5, which means that if the direct effect of 
the policy is to increase hours worked in a week by 1, the total effect including the 
social multiplier is 1.5 hours.
Table 5—Neighborhood Peer Effects
Mothers’ working hours
Years post-childbirth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2SLS Individual IV
Neighbors effect 0.032 0.058 0.167 0.177 0.288 0.134 0.070
(0.023) (0.050) (0.055) (0.077) (0.079) (0.084) (0.104)
F-statistic First Stage 711.60 1,229.00 583.40 295.40 325.60 284.20 272.30
Hausman test p-value 0.23 0.40 0.18 0.22 0.01 0.54 0.89
Observations 45,526 45,526 45,526 45,526 45,526 45,526 45,526
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by municipality. 2SLS Individual IV is the two-stage least 
squares, which controls for the individual IV. Regressors are the same as in Table 3. F-statistic is the F-test for  H 0 
: instruments have zero coefficients.
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The dramatic rise in female labor force participation that took place from the 
1960s onward has been explained in the literature by factors including the expansion 
of female education (Ekstein and Lifshitz 2011) and a reduction in the cost of chil-
dren (Attanasio, Low, and Sánchez-Marcos 2008, Ekstein and Lifshitz 2011). Any 
triggering events that raise female labor supply will have an amplified effect through 
the family peer effect. We extend our calculation of the multiplier effect to examine 
how a policy to raise the compulsory schooling level of education from 10 years to 
11 (or from age 16 to 17) raises the hours worked by women. Note that we use this 
example as an illustration of how the social multiplier works to spread the effect of 
a policy targeting mothers’ labor supply. The true social multiplier effect would be 
applied to a causal estimate of education on mothers’ hours worked. In our model, 
mothers hours worked are affected by her own education (Table A1, part A) and 
that of her family peers (Table A1, part B) although as only the former are generally 
statistically significant we focus on these coefficients to estimate the total effect on 
hours worked from the policy change. The direct effect of an increase in mothers’ 
education by 1 year, assuming she had the compulsory 10 years of schooling is to 
raise her hours by 1.5 hours.17 Adding in the multiplier through the family peer 
effect (multiplying the direct effect of education by the mean multiplier of 1.5), the 
total effect of the education expansion policy is to raise hours by between 1.8 hours, 
which is 48 percent of the direct effect.
Another metric of the importance of the family peer effect in explaining labor 
supply decisions of the mother, is the proportion of the variation in hours explained 
by the family peer effect, at each of the one–seven years after birth. The family peer 
effect 2 years after birth explains 14.7 percent of the variation in hours after 2 years, 
and this proportion falls steadily across the years so that 11.9 percent, 10.9 percent, 
7 percent, 9 percent, and 4.2 percent of the variation in hours 3–7 years after birth is 
explained by the family peer effect, respectively.18
In summary, the family peer effect is an important source of social interaction for 
the hours worked by new mothers. With a multiplier effect larger than one, the fam-
ily peer effect magnifies the effect of a policy targeting labor market hours of new 
mothers or raising the years of compulsory schooling. It explains a large proportion 
of the variation in hours worked, especially between two and four years after birth.
VI. Robustness and Placebo Checks
In our main specification, we have used the neighbor’s hours worked in the year 
after childbirth, averaged across family peers as an instrument. The instrument is 
valid if the mother does not interact with her sister or cousin’s neighbors. We are 
unable to directly test this assumption but we provide evidence on the validity of 
the instrument by including additional instruments and reporting the p-value for 
the Hansen overidentification test. The 2SLS individual IV estimation results are 
17 This is calculated for each year after birth as the sum of the coefficient on mother education and the coeffi-
cient on mother education squared multiplied by 20. Then we calculate the mean. 
18 This was calculated as the ratio between the variance of the average worked hours multiplied by  ρ 2 and the 
variance in the dependent variable. 
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reported in panel A of Table 6. The IVs are the average across the mothers’ family 
peers of their neighborhood average of hours worked, dummy variables for low 
birthweight, very low birthweight, congenital malformation, severe deformity, and 
multiple birth. The p-value for the Hansen test is above or equal 0.32, suggesting 
that our instruments are valid. Note that the F-statistics for the first stage signifi-
cance of the instruments are lower once we combine multiple instruments compared 
to using just one instrument, and therefore the results of Table 6 are less precisely 
estimated than in Table 2. However, the magnitude of the estimated family peer 
effect is in line with Table 2.
Next, we provide further empirical evidence on the validity of our estimation 
method by considering some robustness and placebo checks.
Table 6—Robustness and Placebo Checks
Mothers’ working hours
Years post-childbirth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Panel A. Estimation using multiple IVs
2SLS Individual IV 0.348 0.549 0.418 0.403 0.339 0.309 0.170
(0.139) (0.136) (0.156) (0.162) (0.156) (0.178) (0.159)
F-statistic First Stage 9.387 11.790 11.910 7.341 9.558 7.711 9.223
Hansen test p-value 0.515 0.459 0.522 0.365 0.735 0.318 0.672
Hausman test p-value 0.558 0.627 0.464 0.277 0.174 0.229 0.052
Panel B. Estimation controlling for interactions between occupations and education
2SLS Individual IV 0.165 0.387 0.375 0.232 0.202 0.164 0.134
(0.208) (0.164) (0.178) (0.213) (0.183) (0.225) (0.206)
F-statistic First Stage 30.17 39.38 41.43 31.54 29.23 24.58 31.37
Hausman test p-value 0.12 0.35 0.39 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.07
Observations 39,517 39,517 39,517 39,517 39,517 39,517 39,517
Panel C. Controlling for municipality level 
2SLS Individual IV 0.014 0.371 0.328 0.311 0.258 0.291 0.165
(0.207) (0.167) (0.188) (0.207) (0.172) (0.206) (0.212)
F-statistic First Stage 33.04 44.43 48.82 34.51 35.65 24.81 29.23
Hausman test p-value 0.04 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.16 0.26 0.12
Observations 39,517 39,517 39,517 39,517 39,517 39,517 39,517
Panel D. Placebo 1: Random assignment of peers by education, age at birth, working status one year before birth
% of significant family peer effect 3.8% 3.9% 4.6% 4.0% 4.0% 3.7% 3.9%
Panel E. Placebo 2: Random assignment of peers by year of the child birth 
% of significant family peer effect 4.7% 3.7% 4.4% 3.5% 4.8% 3.4% 3.2%
Panel F. Placebo 3: Effect considering family peers who will become mothers in the future
2SLS Individual IV 0.253 −3.002 −0.358 −0.054 −0.094 −0.022 −0.080
(0.117) (3.313) (0.202) (0.101) (0.095) (0.084) (0.109)
F-statistic First Stage 70.38 0.95 21.56 41.18 81.56 81.15 74.81
Hausman test p-value 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 51,833 51,833 51,833 51,833 51,833 51,833 51,833
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by municipality. Peer effects are estimated using the two-stage 
least squares (2SLS Individual IV). The regressors are the same as Table 3. F-statistic first stage is the F-test for  H 0 : 
instruments have zero coefficients. Percent of significant family peer effect is percentage of estimated peer effects 
out of 1,000 cases (1,000 random assignments), which are statistically significantly different from zero.
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We start by considering two potential threats to our identification strategy. First, 
mothers’ labor supply decisions might affect labor market outcomes of their family 
members and their neighbors through general equilibrium effects in the labor mar-
ket. For example, when a mother (neighbor) gets a job this might be at the expense 
of others, including their excluded peers. Secondly, the mother may work with her 
 family’s  neighbors, existing in the same work peer group. We control for these 
threats by including a set of dummy variables for the mothers’ occupation inter-
acted with dummies for the mothers’ level of education (see Table 6, panel B). After 
adding these new dummy variables the peer effects are less precisely estimated, but 
we still find evidence supporting the presence of a positive family peer effect on 
mothers’ worked hours after childbirth in all years, but statistically significant only 
in the second and third year after childbirth.
Next, we consider an additional violation of our identification strategy, which is 
that the mother may have grown up with her family members’ neighbors. Imagine 
a situation where the mother moved away from her childhood neighborhood but 
her sister did not. Then there may be a direct effect of the family’s neighbors on the 
mother. In panel C of Table 6, we include an additional control that is the average 
hours worked one year after birth at the municipality level, where we exclude the 
mother, similar to controlling for a municipality fixed effect. In Norway there are 
approximately 450 municipalities of a much larger geographical area then neigh-
borhoods. We think that the mother is more likely to meaningfully interact with the 
neighbors she grew up with if they live currently in the same municipality. Also to 
the extent that mothers live in the same municipality when they have their child 
as when growing up, our estimates will be net of the effect of early life neighbors 
on the mothers’ labor supply decisions after birth. The estimates are less precise 
and slightly lower magnitude to our preferred specification but not statistically 
different.19
Our instrument is constructed at the level of the neighborhood and there may be 
unobserved heterogeneity through similarities in characteristics of the mothers and 
of her family’s neighbors. To test for this, we run two placebo tests. First, we ran-
domly assign to each mother a fictitious set of relatives with similar characteristics 
as the true relatives (placebo test 1 in panel D). We divide the sample of mothers into 
cells, or subgroups, defined by the level of the family’s education (below and above 
the average of 12 years), age at birth (below and above the mean age at birth), and 
employment status before giving birth (working and non-working one year before 
the first childbirth). Each family peer of a mother is replaced with the family peer 
of a woman randomly selected from the subgroup of mothers within the same cell. 
We then apply the 2SLS estimation with individual IV to produce an estimate of the 
family peer effect using the observed average worked hours for these fictitious rela-
tives and instrumenting it using the neighbors of these fictitious relatives. We repeat 
this random allocation of relatives to mothers re-shuffling the mothers within cells 
1,000 times and producing 1,000 estimates of the family peer effects. Table 6 (see 
19 Note that a potential worry is the presence of a macroeconomic shock that is common to mothers living in 
different neighborhoods but the same wider area of a municipality. However, in our main estimation we control for 
time varying shocks to the neighborhood and therefore also for any common shock to the wider geographical area. 
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panel C, placebo 1) reports the percentage of cases out of the 1,000 replications in 
which the family peer effect is found to be statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. For each of the seven years after childbirth, the family peer effect is statistically 
significant in less than 5 percent of replications when using fictitious  relatives. 
Therefore, we conclude that the significant family peer effect found in the paper is 
not spuriously explained by similarities in the family peers characteristics.
It may be that the family peer effect we estimate is purely picking up a year effect 
or time trends in hours worked. Similarly to the implementation of the first placebo 
test we divide the sample of mothers into cells by the year of birth of their child 
and we randomly reassigned fictitious relatives to mothers by randomly choosing 
women form the subgroups of mothers with the same year of birth of their child. 
Again, we use these fictitious relative to estimate the family peer effect using 2SLS 
estimation with individual IV and repeating this random assignment of family peers 
within cells 1,000 times. As above in over 95 percent of cases the estimated peer 
effect using fictitious family peers is not different to zero at 5 percent level of sig-
nificance and we conclude that our estimation results are not driven by year or time 
trends effects (see placebo 2 in panel E) Table 6).20
We perform also a third placebo test where the family peers of a mother are 
defined considering sisters and female cousins who will have a child later rather 
than earlier than the mother. We take sisters and cousins who give birth in the future, 
and estimate the effect of the average hours worked by these family peers between 
1–7 years after childbirth. This should break the causal link and give null effects if 
there is no influence from family peers who have not yet had a child. As instruments 
we still use the average of hours worked for the family peers’ neighbors who gave 
birth to their first child between one and five years earlier. The results seem a little 
erratic but suggest that there is no clear statistically significant positive family peer 
effect on mothers’ hours worked (see placebo 3 panel F Table 6).
We check whether the family peer effect is driven by (i) sisters rather than cous-
ins and (ii) by unobserved shared genetic and family background characteristics. 
By estimating the peer effect separately for sisters and female cousins, we find a 
positive and significant peer effects for using both definitions of the family peer 
group (panels A and B in Appendix Table A3 respectively). By considering the peer 
effect of the mothers’ sisters-in-law and female cousins-in-law, who are not genet-
ically related and who do not share any grand-parent with the mother, we find that 
the peer effects are still positive and significantly different from zero (see panel C 
of Appendix Table A3).
In recent years in Norway there have been several reforms with potential conse-
quences for female labor supply: parental leave reforms that expanded the amount of 
leave taken by mothers and introduced a paternity leave (Cools, Fiva, and Kirkebøen 
2015; Dahl, Løken, and Mogstad 2014; Carneiro, Løken, and Salvanes 2015); the 
lowering of school starting age from seven to six (Finseraas, Hardoy, and Schøne 
2015) and universal preschool child care reforms (Havnes and Mogstad 2011a, b; 
Andresen 2014). Nevertheless, the only policy that was actually introduced during 
20 The percentage of repetitions for which the F-statistic in the first stage is greater than 10 is 100 percent in all 
cases, for the two placebo tests. 
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our sample period is a child care reform that was passed in 2002. Andresen (2014) 
describe that the reform that affected mainly 1–2 year olds, which lowered the cost 
of childcare for parents through subsidies and cheaper fees and invested in pre-
school infrastructure. Of our sample children, those born in 2000–2002 may have 
potentially been affected by this policy as their children would be aged 1–2 during 
the post-reform period. To see if our results are driven by the policy, we firstly 
repeated our analysis selecting only the cohorts not affected by the reform and find 
our results are robust. Second we included the municipality level childcare coverage 
(measured as the number of childcare spaces as a proportion of the number of pre-
school children in the municipality) and its interaction with the family peer effect. 
We found no significant interaction, suggesting that our results are not confounded 
by the policy.21
Finally we have estimated a Tobit model to allow working hours to have proba-
bility mass at zero and the corresponding average partial effect of family peers are 
reported in Appendix Table A4. These effects are similar to our main estimation 
results, although slightly less precisely estimated in some regressions.
VII. Conclusions
By estimating the causal family peer effect on a mother’s labor supply decisions 
after childbirth, we show how the influence of a mother’s peers is a relevant mech-
anism that can amplify the effect of changes affecting women’s labor supply. We 
find that the long-run family peer effect on mothers’ decisions to work after the first 
childbirth is large and statistically significant. An increase in the family peer hours 
worked by 1 hour raises the mothers’ working hours by between 18 and 27 minutes. 
Such family peer effects would imply a social multiplier of 1.5, meaning that a 
policy change which causes a direct effect on mothers’ labor supply of 1 working 
hour would be amplified by an additional 0.5 through the indirect effect operating 
via the influence of family peers. In addition to the pure multiplier effect, the family 
peer effect will amplify the effect of other policies which affect female labor supply, 
and we illustrate an example of how this would work with a back of the envelope 
estimate showing that a reform raising the compulsory schooling age in Norway 
from 16 to 17 has a social multiplier effect, which is 48 percent of the direct effect 
of the policy.
While a mother’s working hours is influenced significantly by family peers her 
labor participation decision is not significantly affected by the average working 
hours of her family peers. In keeping with the literature on parental investments 
into child human capital, we show that the influence of family peers on mothers’ 
hours worked is explained by concerns about time allocation between family and 
work from the second year after birth onwards; but as the child ages, concerns about 
financial investments also become important.
To compare our results with the effect of neighbors on women’s labor supply 
found in previous empirical studies, we also use our strategy in reverse to identify 
21 Results are available on request. Note that childcare availability data exists up to 2004 only. 
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the effect of neighbors living in the same post code with the same level of educa-
tion and having giving birth between one and five years earlier than the mother in 
question. We find some significant effects but smaller than the family peer effects. 
This indicates that interactions between neighbors are less relevant than between 
family peers. This may be because mothers are less influenced by their neighbors, or 
because defining neighborhood peers by mothers living in the same neighborhood 
with the same education cannot guarantee that the mothers actually interact with 
other mothers in her postcode.
Finally, our estimation strategy takes account of the reflection problem and endog-
eneity issues. Nevertheless, to reassure ourselves that our results are not biased, we 
run a large set of robustness checks to assess (i) the size of the potential bias caused 
by unobserved shocks for specific occupations and levels of education (such as gen-
eral equilibrium effects or workplace peer effects) or unobserved shocks to a wider 
area than the neighborhood; (ii) the validity of our instruments using extra instru-
mental variables; and (iii) implementing some placebo test where real family peers 
are replaced with fictitious peers with similar characteristics or with cousins who 
give birth in the future. These robustness checks suggest that there is no substantial 
bias in our estimates.
Appendix A: Estimation in Presence of Measurement Errors
In our application, we consider the dependent variable  y ir the number of weekly 
hours worked by a mother in each of the seven years after childbirth. These vari-
ables are subject to measurement error. This is because, for all mothers, we observe 
their working hours in November of the considered year after their childbirth. This 
implies that the number of hours worked  ∆ years after childbirth by women who 
gave birth in January of the year  t is observed in November of the year ( t + ∆ ), i.e., 
[12∆ + 10] months after childbirth, while for women giving birth in December of 
the year  t we observe their labor supply only  [12∆ − 1] months after childbirth. 
Henceforth, we define our outcome variable as the mothers’ working hours  ∆ years 
and 6 months after childbirth, where  ∆ = 1,  … , 7 . This implies that the working 
hours for women who give birth in June of the year  t is correct, but the working 
hours for women who do not give birth in June will be subject to measurement 
error and will be probably overestimated for women giving birth before June and 
underestimated for women giving birth after June. This is especially true for the first 
years after childbirth, where female labor supply is subject to more change than in 
later years.
Furthermore, we do not observe the exact number of hours worked, but we know 
whether the mother works 0, between 1 and 19, 20 and 29, or 30 or more hours per 
week. By rounding the working hours to 0 for non-working mothers and to 10, 24.5, 
and 40 for working mothers, we can use this “rounded” variable and quantify and 
compare differences between mothers in term of hours.
The measurement errors caused by the rounding and by the month of observation 
affect not only the dependent variables  y ir , but also the corresponding average of the 
peers (cousins and siblings),  y 
_
F, i . We do not have any reason to believe that such 
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measurement errors be correlated with any of observed and unobserved variables in 
our model. For this reason, in the following we assume that  y ir follows the model
(3)  y ir =  y ir 
T +  d ir η +  e ir ,
where  y ir 
T is the true working hours,  d ir is a row vector of 12 dummy variables 
indicating the month of birth of the child,  η is the column vector of corresponding 
coefficients, and  e ir is a classical measurement error, which is independently and 
identically distributed across individuals, independent of the true value  y ir 
T and inde-
pendent of the explanatory variables and error term in our model of interest. Under 
this modified classical measurement error model, the error on  y ir does not cause any 
inconsistency as long as we control for the effect of month of birth.
Let us now consider the family peers average of the outcome variable
(4)  y 
_
F, i =  
 ∑ j∈ P Fi   y jr  _________ n Fi  =  
_
 y r 
T(i) +  
_
 dr 
(i) η +  
_




 y r 
T(i) =  
 ∑ j∈ P i   y jr 
T
 _______ n Fi  ,  
_
 d r 
(i) =  
 ∑ j∈ P i   d ir  _______ n Fi  and  
_
 e r 
(i) =  
 ∑ j∈ P i   e jr  _______ n Fi  are the averages across 
family peers excluding the mother  i of the true working hours, of the vector of 
dummy variables for the month of birth and of the measurement error. The terms  
_
 e r 
(i) 
and  e ir are independent because  e ir is independently distributed across mothers 
and  
_
 e r 
(i) is computed excluding the mother  i herself. Under this modified classical 
measurement error model for  y 
_
F, i the consequence of the measurement error is sim-
ply an attenuation bias for the ordinary least square estimation of the main regres-
sion model (2) as long as we control for month of birth dummies averaged across 
the family peers. Furthermore, this attenuation bias tends to cancel when either the 
peer group size increases to infinity so that  
_
 e r 
(i) will tend to zero, or when we use our 
instrumental variable estimation because our instruments are either free of measure-
ment error or with a measurement error which is independent of the family average 
measurement error  
_
 e r 
(i) .
In conclusion, measurement errors for the hours worked do not cause any incon-
sistency for our two-stage least squares estimation, but it can cause some increase in 
the standard errors. We expect the measurement errors  e ir and  
_
 e r 
(i) to be more rele-
vant in the first years after childbirth when most of the mothers have not yet reverted 
back to their standard hours of work.
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Appendix B: Additional Tables
Table A1—Full Second-Stage Results of Table 2 (Part A)
Mothers’ working hours
Years post-childbirth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Endogenous effect of family peers
Average working hours of 0.152 0.446 0.400 0.383 0.304 0.344 0.235
 family peers (0.196) (0.160) (0.180) (0.196) (0.167) (0.197) (0.201)
Effect of individual covariates
Neighborhood mean hours 0.073 0.060 0.072 0.064 0.060 0.052 0.041
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Mother years of schooling 2.104 1.846 1.724 1.492 2.384 3.006 3.673
(0.453) (0.403) (0.457) (0.424) (0.461) (0.529) (0.471)
Mother schooling squared −0.061 −0.044 −0.043 −0.028 −0.055 −0.075 −0.093
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017)
Mother works year prior to birth 9.462 7.023 6.052 5.620 5.049 4.576 4.704
(0.336) (0.284) (0.287) (0.286) (0.275) (0.255) (0.274)
Father earnings 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Father works year post-childbirth 0.479 2.276 1.321 2.177 2.220 2.112 1.661
(0.443) (0.469) (0.464) (0.473) (0.509) (0.536) (0.537)
Mother age at birth 2.857 2.550 2.141 2.104 2.090 1.630 1.399
(0.228) (0.211) (0.231) (0.191) (0.204) (0.219) (0.217)
Mother age at birth squared −0.041 −0.035 −0.028 −0.029 −0.029 −0.021 −0.018
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Father age at birth 0.727 0.483 0.260 −0.038 −0.052 0.153 0.109
(0.154) (0.204) (0.135) (0.135) (0.154) (0.156) (0.127)
Father age at birth squared −0.012 −0.009 −0.005 −0.000 −0.000 −0.003 −0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Low birth weight −0.247 −0.126 −0.153 0.459 0.334 0.055 0.150
(0.446) (0.463) (0.392) (0.404) (0.404) (0.417) (0.417)
Very low birth weight −2.167 −0.570 0.165 −1.272 −0.527 −0.579 0.463
(1.152) (1.167) (1.101) (1.217) (1.116) (1.109) (1.185)
Congenital problems 0.707 −0.993 0.507 0.248 −0.260 −0.140 −0.052
(0.835) (0.776) (0.703) (0.669) (0.639) (0.650) (0.679)
Severe deformity −0.922 0.383 −0.647 −0.982 −0.410 0.020 −0.239
(0.972) (0.817) (0.733) (0.766) (0.788) (0.816) (0.871)
Multiple births −4.306 −3.241 −0.389 0.314 0.339 0.313 0.503
(0.635) (0.608) (0.822) (0.693) (0.680) (0.671) (0.702)
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Results are for the two-stage least squares estimation that con-
trols for the individual IV. Year and month of birth dummies and their averages across family peers are included.
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Table A1—Full Second-Stage Results of Table 2 (Part B)
Mothers’ working hours
Years post-childbirth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Family peers average Exogenous peer effect
Mother years of schooling −0.128 0.165 −0.214 −0.448 −0.084 −0.218 0.226
(0.430) (0.368) (0.389) (0.389) (0.364) (0.477) (0.412)
Mother schooling squared 0.005 −0.015 0.002 0.008 −0.005 −0.004 −0.015
(0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015)
Mother works year prior to birth −0.914 −2.437 −1.817 −1.764 −1.146 −1.361 −0.784
(1.849) (1.241) (1.147) (1.120) (0.853) (0.983) (0.933)
Father earnings 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Father works year post-childbirth 0.194 −0.776 0.564 0.133 −0.445 −1.067 0.594
(0.679) (0.566) (0.502) (0.533) (0.617) (0.703) (0.690)
Mother age at birth −0.039 −0.732 −0.678 −0.647 −0.459 −0.201 −0.243
(0.426) (0.374) (0.411) (0.443) (0.349) (0.383) (0.355)
Mother age at birth squared −0.000 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.001 0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Father age at birth −0.211 −0.140 −0.053 0.180 0.276 0.145 0.022
(0.161) (0.186) (0.148) (0.167) (0.148) (0.151) (0.154)
Father age at birth squared 0.003 0.003 0.001 −0.002 −0.004 −0.002 −0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Low birth weight −0.324 −0.270 0.221 −0.330 −0.668 −0.538 −0.489
(0.525) (0.466) (0.452) (0.482) (0.482) (0.622) (0.537)
Very low birth weight 2.131 −0.093 −1.383 0.370 0.583 0.242 −1.894
(1.269) (1.522) (1.314) (1.417) (1.264) (1.489) (1.452)
Congenital problems −1.765 0.793 −1.011 0.401 0.459 −0.615 −1.506
(0.932) (0.970) (0.783) (0.710) (0.743) (0.873) (0.826)
Severe deformity 1.714 −0.145 0.577 −0.335 −0.051 0.691 2.102
(0.982) (1.048) (1.007) (0.978) (0.987) (1.104) (1.009)
Multiple births 0.341 1.554 0.190 −0.357 0.106 0.023 −0.131
(1.111) (1.020) (1.000) (0.805) (0.753) (0.739) (0.896)
Observations 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985
F-statistic First Stage 37.07 48.48 52.05 37.52 38.79 27.69 32.57
Hausman test p-value 0.10 0.56 0.48 0.46 0.22 0.35 0.18
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Results are for the two-stage least squares estimation that con-
trols for the individual IV. Year and month of birth dummies and their averages across family peers are included.
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Table A2—Full First-Stage Results of Table 2
Family peers’ average working hours
Years post-childbirth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Individual variable Effect of individual covariates
Neighborhood hours 0.010 0.012 0.013 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
Mother schooling 1.196 1.175 0.612 0.272 1.433 1.180 1.186
(0.356) (0.350) (0.308) (0.329) (0.344) (0.296) (0.332)
Mother schooling squared −0.044 −0.040 −0.019 −0.007 −0.051 −0.042 −0.041
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Mother works year prior to birth 0.619 0.645 0.716 0.594 0.666 0.385 0.704
(0.161) (0.164) (0.164) (0.162) (0.165) (0.168) (0.170)
Father earnings −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Father work status −0.107 0.761 0.511 0.223 0.171 −0.026 0.606
(0.412) (0.383) (0.484) (0.448) (0.430) (0.513) (0.461)
Mother age at birth 0.629 0.465 0.403 0.260 0.148 0.337 0.295
(0.153) (0.168) (0.155) (0.166) (0.163) (0.155) (0.167)
Mother age squared −0.012 −0.009 −0.007 −0.006 −0.003 −0.006 −0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Father age at birth 0.178 0.277 0.101 0.135 0.190 0.201 0.008
(0.109) (0.103) (0.099) (0.099) (0.092) (0.111) (0.108)
Father age squared −0.002 −0.004 −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Low birth weight −0.130 0.728 0.255 −0.148 −0.127 −0.107 −0.163
(0.312) (0.334) (0.364) (0.367) (0.347) (0.367) (0.375)
Very low birth weight −0.660 −0.628 −0.348 0.402 −0.250 −0.141 0.055
(1.055) (0.994) (0.818) (0.883) (0.829) (0.873) (0.963)
Congential problems 0.451 0.443 0.483 0.291 0.207 0.439 −0.687
(0.530) (0.716) (0.629) (0.511) (0.591) (0.635) (0.712)
Severe deformity −0.635 −0.320 −0.264 −0.348 −0.417 −1.169 0.714
(0.632) (0.831) (0.734) (0.614) (0.793) (0.841) (0.872)
Multiple births 0.157 −0.139 1.106 0.517 1.212 0.826 1.221
(0.582) (0.479) (0.497) (0.520) (0.530) (0.503) (0.524)
Family peers’ average Exogenous peer effect
Mother schooling −0.307 0.116 −0.092 −0.194 −0.056 0.949 0.916
(0.514) (0.501) (0.425) (0.394) (0.377) (0.407) (0.344)
Mother schooling squared 0.026 0.013 0.019 0.032 0.033 −0.001 0.004
(0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
Mother works year prior to birth 9.392 7.623 6.231 5.726 5.037 4.730 4.451
(0.232) (0.221) (0.234) (0.226) (0.257) (0.234) (0.248)
Father earnings 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Father work status 0.209 0.996 0.862 0.847 1.564 2.349 2.322
(0.471) (0.436) (0.393) (0.469) (0.529) (0.603) (0.617)
Father age at birth 2.105 2.128 1.904 1.806 1.837 1.345 1.186
(0.200) (0.213) (0.196) (0.196) (0.215) (0.206) (0.197)
Mother age at birth −0.026 −0.026 −0.024 −0.022 −0.023 −0.016 −0.014
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Mother age squared 0.224 0.159 0.109 −0.103 −0.212 −0.189 −0.101
(0.139) (0.161) (0.146) (0.128) (0.140) (0.161) (0.141)
Father age squared −0.005 −0.005 −0.003 −0.000 0.001 0.002 −0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Low birth weight 0.199 −0.403 −0.849 −0.805 −0.686 −1.083 −0.787
(0.461) (0.468) (0.495) (0.485) (0.477) (0.525) (0.528)
Very low birth weight 0.120 0.876 1.879 2.714 1.420 2.792 1.201
(1.181) (1.419) (1.642) (1.494) (1.340) (1.395) (1.264)
Congential problems 0.574 −0.045 −0.412 −0.374 0.488 0.550 0.529
(0.713) (0.848) (0.816) (0.834) (0.784) (0.815) (0.854)
Severe deformity −0.039 −0.450 −0.232 0.179 −0.398 −0.192 −0.409
(0.896) (0.988) (0.978) (0.989) (0.983) (1.031) (0.996)
Multiple births −4.256 −3.870 −1.824 −0.323 −0.554 −0.333 −0.639
(0.733) (0.812) (0.787) (0.740) (0.779) (0.925) (0.841)
Instrumental variables Effect of the neighbors of family peers’ characteristics
Hours 0.074 0.087 0.082 0.071 0.080 0.067 0.065
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Results are for the first-stage of the 2SLS estimation that controls 
for the individual IV. Year and month of birth dummies and their averages across family peers are included.
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